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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
PHYLLIS ROSANDER 
LEIGH, 
Deceased. 
Case No. 8628 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
FARMERS MUTUAL AUTOM'OBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
PRELIMINARY STA:TEMENT 
This is an appeal from an order of the trial 
court made on December 10, 1956, vacating and 
setting aside an order appointing one David K. 
Watkiss the administrator of the estate of Phyllis 
Rosander Leigh, upon the grounds that the order 
was void because there were no assets of decedent's 
estate within the State of Utah. (Order in Record; 
pages of Record are unnumbered.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with most of appellant's 
Statement of Facts but controverts the assertion 
that the wrecked automobile constituted an asset. 
(Record, Paragraph II of the Petition for Appoint-
ment of Administrator.) Also, appellant's State-
ment of Facts should be supplemented by the follow-
ing additional facts: At the time of her death 
Leigh was a resident and domiciled in the State 
of Minnesota. She carried a policy of public liability 
insurance with the Farmers Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company, a Wisconsin corporation, which 
has never qualified and is not authorized to do 
business in Utah. That after his appointment, suit 
was filed in the Third Judicial District Court against 
Watkiss as the administrator of the estate of Leigh 
by Edward Rawlinkiewicz to recover personal in-
jury damages claimed to have been sustained by 
reason of the negligence of Leigh, and Watkiss, 
purporting to act as administrator of the estate, 
made demand upon respondent to defend the action, 
claiming it was obligated to do so under the terms 
of the insurance policy. That thereafter the insur-
ance company applied to the court to have the ap-
pointment of Watkiss revoked upon the grounds 
set forth in this petition. (Record.) 
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STATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
POINT I. 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT 
TO FILE THE PETITION TO REVOKE THE APPOINT-
MENT OF DAVID K. WATKISS AS ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTINGENT CLAIM AGAINST THE IN-
SURANCE COMPANY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
ASSET SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATION IN UTAH. 
POINT III. 
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
THE APPOINTMENT OF WATKISS SHOULD BE RE-
VOKED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT 
TO FILE THE PETITION TO REVOKE THE APPOINT-
MENT OF DAVID K. WATKISS AS ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH. 
The first question requiring consideration is 
whether the insurance company has the right to 
file the Petition for Revocation of Letters of Ad-
ministration issued to Watkiss. 
Our statutes provide: 
"Utah Code Annotated 1953, 75-1-8. Collater-
al attack prohibited: - An objection to any 
paper, petition, decree or order in any probate 
or guardianship matter, for an erroneous or 
defective statement or determination of any 
fact necessary to jurisdiction which actually 
existed, or for an omission to find or state 
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any such fact in such paper, petition, decree 
or order, is available only on direct a pplica-
tion to the same court, or on appeal." 
"Utah Code Annotated 1953, 75-14-14. Any 
interested person has the right to be heard. 
Any person shall have a right to be heard 
by the court at any hearing on any question 
affecting a probate or guardianship matter 
in which he is interested." 
These statutes should be sufficient in support 
of the insurance company's right to file the petition. 
Petitioner is certainly an "interested party" in hav-
ing determined whether at the demand of Watkiss 
it is obligated to defend the action, that is, whether 
Watkiss was properly appointed so as to entitle him 
to make the demand. 
In the cases of In re Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 
P. 784 and In re Low ham's Estate, 30 Utah 436; 85 
P. 445, there were petitions by the defendants to 
revoke the letters of administration theretofore 
granted by the court. 
In Bancroft Probate Practice, Volume 2, Sec. 
289, it is stated: 
"Defective Appointment or Want of Jur-
isdiction.- To a certain extent, and whether 
or not the order of appointment is 'void' in the 
sense that it may be collaterally attacked, 
a petition to rel·oke letters is regarded as an 
alternative for an appeal from the order of 
appo1~ntmcn t. Thus such a petition has been 
resorted to as a mode of attack upon a finding 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the court that the residence of the decedent 
was in the county in which letters were issued, 
and the attempt supported as a 'direct' attack. 
As the New Mexico court observes, more-
over, while the appointment of an adminis-
trator is a final judgment in the sense that it 
is appealable, it is in no sense a finality so 
far as the estate is concerned. If the court 
were precluded from a reinvestigation of the 
facts upon which letters were granted, the 
veriest imposter might obtain letters and, 
after the period for appeal has elapsed, re-
main securely in an office to which he has no 
right, with no court having power to remove 
him." 
In the case of Louisville v. Herb, the court re-
marks: 
"If he was not lawfully appointed, the 
petitioner has the right to show that fact, 
and thus defend itself from being harassed 
by a suit brought without authority of law, 
and from complications that may arise, should 
his letters of administration be revoked, upon 
the application of someone interested in the 
estate of the decedent as a creditor, next of 
kin, or otherwise. The right of a plaintiff 
to man tain an action in the capacity he sues, 
or to sue in a particular court or jurisdic-
tion, may always be challenged by a defen-
dant, although he may be liable for the wrong 
sought to be redressed in a suit brought in 
a proper court, by the proper party. This 
proceeding is the only manner in which the 
validity of letters of administration can be 
called into question." 
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POINT II. 
THE CONTINGENT CLAIM AGAINST THE IN-
SURANCE COMPANY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
ASSET SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATION IN UTAH. 
This question has been passed upon by anum-
ber of courts. In some states it is held that a con-
tingent claim against an insurance company is not 
an asset of the insured's estate until the primary li-
ability of the insured has been established by judg-
ment against him. Furthermore, it is held that the 
situs of any such claim is at the domicile of the in-
sured and that it has no situs in a foreign state. 
In Rogers v. Anderson (Kan.) 190 P. 2 857, 
Rogers was a resident of North Carolina and never 
had been in Marshall County, Kansas. Edwards was 
a resident of Marshall County, Kansas and died 
from injuries sustained in a collision with a car 
driven by Rogers, operated within Saline County, 
Kansas. Rogers was killed in the war and his will 
probated in North Carolina. At the time of the col-
lision , he had a policy issued by the American In-
demnity Company. The probate court of Marshall 
County, Kansas, appointed one Crouse as adminis-
trator of the Kansas estate of Rogers. The Kansas 
statute provides: 
"Proceedings for the probate of a will 
or the administration shall be had in the coun-
ty of the residence of the decedent at the time 
of his death; if the decdent was not a resident 
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of this state, proceedings may be had in any 
county wherein he left any estate to be ad-
ministered." 
The opinion is very lengthy and the court dis-
cusses the question of what constitutes 'estate' and 
also the situs of in tangible assets : 
"Appellant, however, further asserts the 
policy, under the admitted facts, cannot con-
stitute a present asset of the insured's estate 
anywhere. In support she cites our decisions 
holding an insurer, under the terms of this 
policy, is merely an indemnitor and as such 
can only be subjected to judgment on the 
policy after liability of the insured for dam-
ages has been finally determined. We have so 
held. A few of the cases are Schoonover v. 
Clark, 155 Kan. 835, 837, 130 P. 2 619; Lang 
v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's, 157 Kan. 314, 
319, 139 P. 2 414; Lechleitner v. Cummings, 
160 Kan. 453, 458, 163 P. 2 423, and cases 
therein cited. In other words, appellant states 
that prior to the occurrance of the condition 
precedent specified in the policy, the insured, 
if living, would have no cause of action against 
the insurer and a fortiori the policy does not 
now constitute an asset of the insured's es-
tate left in Kansas to be administered. 
"Assuming for the moment the adminis-
trator was properly appointed and assuming 
further that the situs of the policy was in 
Kansas, this question persistently intrudes-
what estate did the policy contain or create 
for the administrator to administer in Kan-
sas? At this time and at any time prior to 
judgment against the insured such adminis-
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trator could not draw to the estate any asset 
provided by the policy. Assuming the admin-
istrator of the Edward's estate instituted an 
action against the administrator of Rogers' 
estate for the purpose of recovering damages 
resulting from the automobile collision, gar-
nishment proceedings against the insurer 
would not lie prior to rendition of judgment 
or agreement of liability ... " 
After quoting other Kansas cases, the court 
proceeds: 
"In the Moore case, supra, this court said: 
'The principal administration to which 
all others are subordinate, is at the domicile 
of the intestate, and the universally recog-
nized rule of law is that the succession tq and 
distribution of personal estate is governed 
by the law of the place where the intestate 
was domiciled at the time of his death. 
''The original administrator, therefore, 
with letters taken out at the place of the dom-
icile, is invested with the title to all the per-
sonal property of the deceased, for the pur-
pose of collecting the effects of the estate, 
paying the debts, and making distribution of 
the residue according to the law of the place 
or directions of the will, as the case may be." 
(Citations). 
In the Modern Woodmen case, supra, this court 
stated: 
'The fact that the beneficiary certificate 
sued on was in Douglas County was not of 
itself sufficient to empower the probate court 
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to appoint a guardian for the infants there. 
The instrument created a simple contract 
debt. The substantial property right adhered 
to the debt, rather than to the instrument 
evidencing it, and in legal estimation its situs 
followed the domicile of the owner. In Moore, 
Admx. v. Jordan, 36 Kan. 271, 13 P. 337, 59 
Am. Rep. 550, it was held that a note and 
mortgage belonging to a man dying in Color-
ado, with the instruments in his possession 
there, were not assets in the hands of his 
widow as administratrix, appointed in Color-
ado, but belonged to an administrator ap-
pointed at the decedent's domicile in Illinois; 
and the doctrine is illustrated by numerous 
decisions cited in the opinion. Under the same 
principle, if the beneficiary certificate had its 
situs at the domicile of the owners in Mis-
souri, it could not have been assets in the 
hands of a guardian appointed in Kansas, and 
hence could not have been the foundation of 
any order appointing such guardian.' Pages 
137, 138 of 66 Kan., Page 281 of 71 P. 
In the Miller case, supra, we find the following 
'Was it the duty of the probate court to 
appoint an administrator on the application 
of a creditor of the decedent? Miller was a 
nonresident of Kansas, and the question is, 
Did he leave anything here on which to found 
administration? It has been held that: 
'Where a person dies intestate, who was 
not a resident or inhabitant of the state at 
the tilne of his death, and who left no estate 
within the state to be administered, a pro-
bate court of the state has no jurisdiction to 
issue letters of administration on the estate 
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of such intestate, and, where letters are is-
sued, the acts of the court in doing so are 
utterly null and void.' ( Citations) ". 
See also Olson v. Preferred Automobile Insur-
ance Company, (Mich.) 244 NW 178. 
In Wheat v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of 
New York, (Colo.) 261 P. 2 493, the court made the 
same ruling as in the Kansas case, that such a con-
tingent claim did not constitute an asset and that 
this was true even though the insurance company 
which issued the policy was doing business in the 
foreign state where it was claimed such contingent 
claim existed as an asset. In said case Wheat, driv-
ing a car going south, attempted to pass another 
car and collided headon with a car going north, 
driven by Leonard Wheat (no relation). Both al-
bert and Leonard ·were killed. Albert was a resident 
of Georgia and Leonard of Missouri. Plaintiffs were 
the surviving wife and minor daughter of Leonard 
Wheat. Albert· carried liability insurance in defen-
dant company. An administrator for his estate was 
appointed in Georgia and his only tangible asset was 
the damaged car which the administrator sold. Mrs. 
Leonard Wheat applied for letters of adiministra-
tion in the estate of Albert in Colorado, and the peti-
tion was denied. She then filed another petition, 
claiming to be a creditor of Albert, and one Delahay 
was appointed and Mrs. Leonard vVheat then filed 
10 
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an action for damages against Delahay as adminis-
trator and he demanded of the insurance company 
that it defend. The insurance company then moved 
to vacate the order appointing Delahay on the ground 
of lack of jurisdiction because Albert J. Wheat was 
a non-resident of Colorado and left no property, 
real or personal, therein. The motion was denied and 
the insurance company secured certiorari and the 
District Court quashed the appointment of the ad-
lninistrator. On appeal, the court stated that the 
question for determination was: 
"The trial court found that at the time 
of the appointment of Delahay as adminis-
trator, there was no property in Colorado, 
tangible or in tangible, over which the county 
court had any jurisdiction or control. As 
hereinbefore stated, the wrecked automobile 
was the· only tangible property in Colorado 
at the time of the accident, and when the duly 
appointed administrator of the estate of Al-
bert J. Wheat in Georgia made disposition of 
the automobile, the purchasers took and can 
hold the same free from any lien of the claims 
of creditors, because he was the duly appoint-
ed representative of the heirs of the estate, 
and our statute so provides. As to the question 
of the indemnity policy here involved consti-
tuting an asset of the estate, we believe the 
following quotation from Rogers v. Edwards, 
164 Kan. 492, 190 P. 2 857, 862, to be well 
reasoned and in point : 
'If the rights of the insured against the 
insurer, under an ordinary indemnity policy, 
11 
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constitute assets of the nonresident insured's 
estate, prior to the establishment of liability 
of such estate to third persons, the situs of 
such assets is at the domicile of the nonresi-
dent. The mere fact that a foreign insurance 
company which issued the policy is also au-
thorized to transact business in Kansas does 
not change the situs of such asset, if it be an 
asset prior to the establishment of the insur-
ed's liability, from the domicile of the non-
resident to the state of Kansas. 
'Of course, every state is, and should be, 
anxious to protect and convenience its own 
citizens so far as possible. No state is under 
duty to permit assets of debtors to be placed 
beyond the reach of its own creditors where 
it can legally retain such assets. But in order 
to retain them they must first exist here. To 
hold the policy in question has its situs in 
Kansas for purposes of administration would 
be contrary to the principle repeatedly enun-
ciated in our prior decisions. In view of our 
firmly established and well understood doc-
trine, which we regard as sound, we do not 
desire to confuse it. A conclusion that this in-
demnity policy constitutes 'estate' left by the 
nonresident decedent to be administered in 
Marshall County would mean this policy con-
stitutes 'estate' which may be administered 
in any county in Kansas and in any county 
of every other state of the union, with a simi-
lar statute, in which the insurer is authorized 
to transact business. We do not think the sta-
tute was intended to produce such a result.' 
If this court follows the foregoing decisions, 
then it is apparent that in this case there are no 
1~ 
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assets of the estate of Mrs. Leigh in Utah. How-
ever, we do not wish to withhold from the court what 
we have discovered with reference to the decisions 
of some other courts on this question and therefore 
call attention to cases of other jurisdictions which 
hold that such a contingent claim which, accord-
ing to some authorities, has its situs only at the 
domicile of the creditor may, under certain circum-
stances, also constitute an asset where the debtor 
resides. In other words, these cases hold that the situs 
of the claim is not only at the insured's domicile but 
where the claim may be enforced. It is so held in 
Illinois under a statute which expressly provides 
that choses in action are located where the debtor 
resides, Furst against Brady, (Ill.) 31 NE2 606. 
However, in the case at bar the insurance company, 
if considered to be a debtor before judgment against 
the insured, does not reside in Utah. 
Also the following cases hold that such a con-
tingent claim is an asset in a foreign state: Robin-
son v. John Dana's Estate, (N. Hampshire) 174 
Atl. 772; Gordon v. Shea, (Mass.) 14 NE2 105; In 
re Vilas Estate, (Ore.) 110 P. 2 940. 
But in each of these cases the insurance com-
pany against which the claim was or was to be as-
serted, was doing business in the state where the 
administrator of the insured's estate was appointed. 
As stated in the Robinson-Dana case: 
13 
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"For the purpose of ownership, the credi-
tor's domicile is generally regarded determin-
ative of the fictional locality of the debt. But 
since enforcement may be only where the 
debtor or his property is found, the debt must 
be owned by the creditor there as well as 
owed by the debtor. VVhile as to ownership, 
"debts can have no locality separate from the 
parties to whom they are due" (Cleveland, 
etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, 320, 
21 L. ed. 179), in respect to enforcement, "It 
is useless to say that a chose in action follows 
the person of the creditor when the matter in 
hand is the enforcement of payment by a suit 
at law." 11 Harv. Law Rev. 101. "For the 
purpose of collection a debt is always ambu-
latory, and accompanies the person of a debt-
or." 5 RCL 931." 
In Gordon v. Shea the appointment of the ad-
ministrator was approved because the insurance 
company against which the contingent claim existed 
was authorized to do business in Massachusetts, and 
in the Vilas Estate case it was held: 
"Executors and administrators. Where 
insured under automobile liability policy, who 
was resident of Washington was killed in 
automobile collision in Oregon, in which occu-
pant of other automobile was injured, and 
insnrer under policy was at time of accident 
and ever since such t1"me authorized to do 
business in Oregon, liability of insurer on 
policy was an "asset" of deceased motorist's 
estate within meaning of statute, warranting 
appointment of administrator in Oregon, so 
that an action could be brought on claim of 
liability arising out of accident." 
1-1 
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If this court follows the decisions of the courts 
in Colorado, Kansas and Michigan it will hold that 
the contingent claim against the Farmers Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company is not an asset in 
Utah; first because its situs is in Minnesota, the 
domicile of Mrs. Leigh, and second because it cannot 
be an asset until after judgment against the insured. 
If the court follows the New Hampshire, Mass-
achusetts, and Oregon cases it will likewise hold that 
the contingent claim does not constitute an asset 
in Utah of Mrs. Leigh's estate because the insurance 
company is not doing business in Utah and there-
fore the claim cannot be enforced in Utah, the courts 
having no jurisdiction over said company. 
Let us now consider the last question to be 
determined. 
POINT III. 
UNDER ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
THE APPOINTMENT OF WATKISS SHOULD BE RE-
VOKED. 
Assuming that there are no assets of Mrs. Leigh 
in Utah, did the court have jurisdiction to appoint 
vVatkiss as administrator? If it had jurisdiction did 
it abuse its discretion in making the appointment? 
Our statute, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec. 75-1-2 
provides: 
15 
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"Where wills proved, and letters grant-
ed. - Wills must be proved and letters testa- . r 
mentary or of administration granted: 
(1) If the decedent was a resident of 
the state, in the county in which he had his 
residence at the time of his death. 
(2) If the decedent was a nonresid- i 
dent of the state: first, in the county in which l •· 
he may have died leaving estate therein; sec- 1 :· 
ond, in any county in which any part of the 
estate may be, the decedent not having left 
estate in the county in which he died, or hav-
ing died without the state. 
( 3) In all other cases, in the county 
where application for letters is first made." 
In Re Tasanen's Estate, 25 Utah 396, 71 Pac. 
984, the facts were that Tasanen, an employee in 
Wyoming of the Diamond Coal and Coke Company, 
met his death in Wyoming. The Coal and Coke Com-
pany was also doing business in Utah. An adminis-
trator of Tasanen's estate was appointed in Utah 
on the basis of the cause of action existing against 
the coal company. It will be noted that the claim 
was not a contingent one as in the case we are con-
sidering but was one of direct liability, and further-
more it was one enforceable in Utah because the 
coal and coke company was doing business in Utah. 
In sustaining the lower court's refusal to set aside 
the appointment of the Utah administrator, the 
court stated that there was a conflict of authority 
on the question whether a clain1 for death was an 
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asset and it preferred the view that it was, but the 
court held it was not required to follow either view 
because under the last paragraph of Utah Code An-
notated 1953, Section 75-1-2: 
"In all other cases, in the county where 
application for letters is first made", 
it was immaterial whether or not there were any 
assets that : 
"If there should be nothing which the ad-
ministrator could legally do it could harm 
nobody. If there should be something which 
the administrator ought to do, then the ap-
pointment would be necessary". 
There is implicit in this statement the conclu-
sion that if there should be nothing the administra-
tor could legally do, his appointment would be un-
necessary. Furthermore, it was unnecessary for the 
court to decide that an administrator might be ap-
pointed if there were no assets because in the Tas-
anen case there was an asset, to wit: A direct liabi-
lity of the coal and coke company, a transitory right 
which, having origin in Wyoming, could be sued on 
in Utah where defendant was doing business. It 
invoked the principle as laid down in Utah Savings 
and Trust Company v. Diamond Coal and Coke Com-
pany, 26 Utah 299, 73 P. 524, to wit: 
"Nature of Action-Enforcement-Suit 
in Different State-Transitory: -. The right 
of action for wrongful death provided by Re-
17 
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vised Statutes Wyoming 1887, section 2364a, 
and the following section, is not limited in its 
enforcement to a trustee for the persons en-
titled to damages recovered therein, appointed 
in that state, but the right of action is transi-
tory in its nature, and may be maintained 
in the courts of another State having juris-
diction of such matters, and having acquired 
jurisdiction of the parties.'' 
The holding of the court in the Tasanen case 
that an administrator may be appointed even though 
there are no assets is purely dictum. 
Coming back to the question of the appointment 
of Watkiss and again assuming that there are no 
assets of Mrs. Leigh's estate in Utah, we call atten-
tion to authorities which hold that the court is with-
out jurisdiction to appoint an administrator if there 
are no assets within the court's jurisdiction. As 
state In re Dickerson's Estate, (Nev.) 268 P. 769 
it is said: 
"In California, under probate provisions 
similar to ours, it is well settled that the own-
ership of property by the decedent is essential 
to the granting of letters of administration of 
his estate (Citations). Such also is the weight 
of authority generally. But the citation of 
authority from other jurisdictions is without ·. 
any useful purpose. 
It is clearly within the expression of our 
statutes that an estate is essential to a grant 
of letters. The proofs adduced at the hearing 
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showed no estate, legal or equitable, belong-
ing to the estate sought to be administered. 
Consequently there was nothing for the court 
to act upon." 
See also Olson v. Insurance Company, (Mich.) 
244 NW 178; Wheat v. Fidelity and Casualty Com-
pany of New York, (Colo.) 261 P. 2 493. 
However, even if technically the court has juris-
diction and it is so held in some jurisdictions, never-
theless it would not be abuse of discretion of the 
court to refuse to make such an appointment. In 
re Carter's Estate, (Okla.) 240 P. 727 as stated 
by the court : 
"It is clearly shown by the evidence that 
the estate of the deceased, subject to the claims 
of his creditors, amounted to nothing, and the 
great weight of authority is to effect that, 
where there is no other sufficient reason for 
the appointment of an administrator, except 
to take charge and administer the assets of 
an estate, and there are no assets, then in that 
event the refusal of the court to appoint an 
administrator is within the discretion of the 
court. And in this case we hold that the court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ap-
point an administrator." 
If there should be a judgment against Watkiss 
it would 'be worthless. 
In Bancrofts Probate Practice, Vol. 2, Sec. 465 
it is said: 
"'There is no personal liability of an ex-
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ecutor or administrator as the result of judg-
ments entered against him in his representa-
tive capacity". 
Our statute, Section 75-9-15 provides: 
''Judgment against personal representa-
tives - Effect: - A judgment rendered 
against an executor or administrator upon 
any claim for money against the estate of his 
testator or intestate only establishes the claim 
in the same manner as if it had been allowed 
by the executor or administrator and the 
judge; and the judgment must be that the 
executor or administrator pay in due course 
of administration the amount ascertained to 
be due. A certified transcript of the original 
docket of the judgment must be filed among 
the papers of the estate in court. No execution 
shall issue upon such judgment, nor shall it 
create any lien upon the property of the es-
tate, or give to the judgment creditor any 
priority of payment." 
In Munton v. Bekins, (Cal.) 49 P. 2 338 the 
court afifrms what our statute declares: 
"The judgment is upon a claim against 
the estate and while such a judgment, when 
it becomes final, conclusively establishes the 
validity of the claim for the amount of the 
judgment, yet the judgment takes on the status 
merely of an allo1red claim". 
This statute of ours which fixes the status of 
the judgment as an "allowed claim" really 1nakes it 
a judgment against assets if there are any assets. 
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In other words, as there is no personal liability of 
the administrator, the judgment is one in rem. 
No,v, there being no assets in Utah, the con-
tingent claim against the insurance company having 
no situs in Utah, and no primary liability of the 
insured having been established and such contin-
gent claim being in any event unenforceable in Utah, 
any judgment Rawlinkiewicz might o b t a i n 
would be worthless. Why should petitioner be 
obliged to incur the expense of defending an action 
against Watkiss? We can only assume that Ridge-
way's counsel believes that such a judgment, though 
not enforceable in Utah, would be entitled to full 
faith and credit under the United States Constitu-
tion and could be sued on in a state where jurisdic-
tion over the insurance company can be obtained. 
This is a vain hope. In the first place it could not 
possibly be res adjudicata because: (a) The judg-
ment of the Utah court has not the effect of any or-
dinary judgment of the District Court for it has 
only the status of an allowed claim to be satisfied 
out of Utah assets, if any. (b) The Utah judgment 
against the Utah administrator would not even be 
evidence againce the insurance company, an en-
tirely different party defendant, in a foreign state. 
(c) The causes of action - that is, the cause of 
action against Leigh's administrator in Utah and 
a so-called cause of action upon such a judgment 
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against the insurance company would be different, 
and any such Utah judgment (if it can be called 
a judgment) would not even be evidence in an action 
against the insurance company in another state. 
(d) Being merely a judgment in rem, such a judg-
ment would have no extra-territorial effect. 
A judgment in rem has no extra-territorial ef-
fect or efficiency beyond the state or jurisdiction of 
the court which renders it. (31 Am. Jur. 104.) 
A judgment against an administrator in one 
state affords no basis for an action against an ad-
ministrator of the estate of the same decedent in 
another state (Braithwaite v. Harvey, (Mont.) 36 
P. 38), and this is true even though the causes of 
action were identically the same. (Ingersoll v. Cor-
am, 127 F. 418.) 
See note to 3 ALR 64. 
If such a judgment could not affor~ a basis for 
an action against an administrator of the same 
decedent in another state it certainly could not form 
the basis of an action against any third party in 
such other state. 
Finally, we inquire, why should \Vatkiss be 
permitted to remain in office as administrator when 
there are no Utah assets for him to administer; 
when if he obtains a judgment in Utah it can neither 
be satisfied here nor form the basis for an action in 
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another state against the insurance company. The 
trial court had a right, and we respectfully urge 
that it had the duty, to terminate a proceeding which 
is without foundation in fact or law. This is one 
case where the court is authorized by statute to act. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 75-6-1 pro-
vides: 
"Grounds for: The court may at any time 
suspend any administrator, executor or guar-
dian; and may, upon citation, revoke the let-
ters of any administrator upon petition of a 
competent person having a prior right there-
to who had no opportunity to apply, or of 
any administrator of the estate of a supposed 
intestate whose will was subsequently found 
and admitted to probate, or of any executor, 
administrator or guardian for neglect, mis-
management, waste, embezzlement, incompe-
tency or incapacity, or because of his convic-
tion of an infamous crime, or for any other 
reason deemed sufficient by the court." 
Appellant's brief consists mostly of a discus-
sion of matters which do not relate to the question 
here involved. Counsel cites the Utah Survival 
Statute giving a right of action for injury or death 
against estate of a legal wrongdoer. He cites the 
rule relating to the appointment of guardians for 
infants and incompetent persons and refers to the 
statute concerning service upon the Secretary of 
State in an action against a nonresident motorist. 
All these are extraneous matters. He argues that by 
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accepting a premium the insurance company under 
its policy, is obligated to defend a cause of action 
arising out of the negligence of Mrs. Leigh in any 
State in the United States, including, of course, the 
State of Utah, but he seemingly does not understand 
the position of the insurance company's objection, 
which is, as previously stated, that since the insur-
ance company cannot be subjected to the jurisdic-
tion of the Utah courts because it is not doing busi-
ness in Utah, it would be unjust to compel it to 
incur the expense of defending the case brought 
against W atkiss when nothing whatever of bene-
fit to the plaintiff would, or could be accomplished 
by such action. Suppose the insurance company 
should assume the defense of Watkiss and suppose 
the plaintiff should secure a judgment, how could 
the plaintiff be benefited? The judgment would 
merely be against Utah assets of the Leigh estate, 
and payable out of such assets in the ordinary course 
of administration. (Sec. 75-9-15, Uwh Code An-
now ted; Smith v. Hanson, 34 Ut. 171, 96 P. 1087.) 
In N.ewton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 88 Ut. 547, 
40 P. 2d 204, it is said: 
"Under the provisions of 102-9-15, R. S. 
Utah 1933, a judgment rendered against an 
executor or administrator upon a claim for 
money against the estate represented by such 
executor or administrator established the 
claim in the same n1anner as if it had been 
regularly allowed. The statute then further 
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provides that the judgment must be that the 
executor or administrator pay in due course 
of administration, the amount ascertained to 
be due. Further proceedings are then specifi-
cally provided for the collection and payment 
of the claim. The judgment herein is a judg-
ment against the executor in its official capa-
city only and could be paid only as provided 
by the statute. As was said by the court in 
the case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. v. Bleicher, 64 Ut. 49, 228 P. 188, after 
quoting section 7659, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
now 102-9-15, R. S. Utah 1933, supra: 
"'The statute thus, in specific terms, de-
termines the legal effect of the judgment 
against an estate, and it further determines 
that the allowance of a claim is in legal effect 
precisely the same as a judgment; namely, 
that in either case the only fact that is estab-
lished is the amount of the claim and that it 
must be paid in due course of administration. 
And, in order to prevent all complications, the 
statute further provides that no execution can 
be issued on the judgment, that it creates no 
lien upon any property and that the judgment 
does not give a preference to any creditor." 
A judgment against Watkiss would not only be 
useless and ineffectual in Utah, it would be use-
less as a basis for an action in another State. Such 
a judgment is not against the administrator person-
ally, but only against assets in his hands. It affords 
no basis for an action against the insurance com-
pany in another state because it has no extra-terri-
torial effect being merely a judgment in rem. (31 
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Am. Jr. 103-4; 34 C.J. 1174). It would not be en-
titled to full faith and credit under the United States 
Constitution. 
What would be the use of taking the time of 
the court and causing the insurance company the 
great expense of a trial under such conditions? It is 
undisputed that there are no assets other than the 
claim against the insurance company and as that 
contingent claim is not enforceable in Utah, it is 
not an asset in Utah and there are no assets out 
of which such judgment could be paid. The cases 
heretofore cited are to the effect that a contingent 
claim against an insurance company is an asset 
in a state foreign to the residence of the insured 
and the only cases cited to the contrary are those 
which hold that it is an asset in a foreign state, only 
if the insurance company is doing business in such 
foreign state. The contingent claim being no asset 
in Utah, why permit the appointment of an admin-
istrator to stand when he has no assets to adminis-
ter and why make it necessary for the insurance 
company to defend hin1 when the plaintiff could 
get nothing by its judgment in Utah or make any 
claim against the insurance company by virtue of 
such judgment either in Utah or any other state? 
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CONCLUSION 
1. The court appointed Watkiss administra-
tor only on the theory that the contingent claim 
against the insurance company is an asset in Utah 
of the Leigh estate (see petition for appointment 
of administrator in Record.) We believe it .is not 
such an asset. 
2. As any judgment obtained by Watkiss 
would merely occupy the status of an allowed claim 
against the Leigh estate in Utah and payable out of 
Utah assets in the regular course of administration 
and as there can be no resort to the insurance com-
pany to satisfy the judgment and as there is no other 
property out of which that judgment could be satis-
fied, it was error to appoint Watkiss 'because there 
was nothing for him to do. 
3. The appointment of Watkiss was a useless 
proceeding and the court under Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, Sec. 75-6-1, had authority to revoke his 
letter. This the court should do when, if judgment 
goes in his favor, plaintiff can gain nothing. The in-
surance company should not be put to the expense of 
defending a case which, in any event, would result 
only in a worthless judgment. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should affirm the order of the trial court revoking 
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the appointment of David K. Watkiss as the Admin-
istrator of the Estate of Phyllis Rosander Leigh. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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